Minutes of Meeting: Radiation Safety Committee.

Date: Monday 25 September 1995


Subject(s): PASS system status.

Reliance upon the Particle Accelerator Safety System (PASS) during the initial process of FEB extraction and ATR beamline commissioning was discussed by the committee. As a first point, the Accelerator Readiness Review (ARR) committee has decided to conditionally approve the commissioning of the FEB extraction process and ATR transport to the W line beam dump. This approval is contingent upon the use of LOTO of access gates and administrative procedures in place to control and allow access to the FEB areas. There can be no reliance upon the PASS system to perform this function until the system documentation is complete and verified. Therefore, the following represents the consensus of the RSC as to how to meet these restrictions;

1. Procedures for securing and access to the FEB areas must be re-written to exclude specific reliance on the PASS system. Included here is the sweep and secure of the FEB berm as a High Radiation Area since no immediate credit can be taken for the chipmunks.

2. The procedures must indicate that PASS can be used in a “studies mode” but control of areas is accomplished with two dissimilar locks on each access gate.

3. Frequent, direct inspection (~ once per hour) of all FEB area gates is required for a nominal period of a week. A log of these inspections must be kept in the MCR. These inspections should not be done by MCR personnel.

4. PASS may be used to monitor gate and area status (i.e. mode) from the MCR interface, (for all four PLCs of both division A & B of 921 and 1000P). A log of the gate status and area mode must be kept in MCR and all mode changes (User requested and system initiated).
5. Whenever an access is made to an FEB area, the PASS related procedures should be followed and the mode changes documented in the same logbook in MCR.

6. After the nominal one week period, the results of items # 3 - 6 will be reviewed by the RSC to determine if the direct inspections should be eliminated. The basis for this decision involves the monitoring of gates and if the PASS system acted appropriately for a given mode change.

7. Each access gate must be appropriately posted to warn personnel of the potential hazard inside.

After some experience has been gained in the use of the PASS system in this "studies mode" and the required system documentation is complete and verified, the RSC will again review the PASS system for more routine use.

cc: RSC  
RSC file  
R. Frankel